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Abstract 
Consumers can choose from a wide range of electricity supply contracts, including green 
power options. Electricity produced from renewable energy involves information 
asymmetries. With a sample of more than 2,000 German electricity consumers, we tested the 
proposition of a “lemon market” for renewable energy in a discrete choice experiment. 
Specifically, we found that, compared to investor-owned firms, additional willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) for renewable energy is approximately double when offered by cooperatives or 
municipally-owned electricity utilities. Consumers who are experienced with switching 
suppliers have an additional WTP of one Eurocent per kilowatt hour for cooperatives and two 
Eurocents for public enterprises. The results demonstrate that organizational transformation in 
dynamically-changing electricity markets is not only driven by political initiatives but also by 
consumers’ choices on the market. Public policy may reduce information asymmetries by 
promoting government labeling of green energy products. 
Keywords: Cooperatives; Discrete Choice Experiment; Germany 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, European retail markets for electricity have changed 
fundamentally, and market deregulation has occurred in most countries. Currently, electric 
utilities owned by municipalities compete for customers with investor-owned firms and newly 
formed consumer-owned cooperatives. In the fulfillment of international agreements, 
European countries also strive for greening their energy systems, and various policy 
instruments have been established to ensure a reduction in carbon emissions from electricity 
generation (Lehmann et al., 2012). For instance, Germany – Europe’s largest economy – has 
decided to phase out the utilization of nuclear power and increase its share of renewable 
energy sources in electricity generation to at least 40 percent by the year 2025 (Renewable 
Energy Act, 2014).  
At the municipal level, political referenda initiated by citizens have called for the 
reorganization of local energy supply. In Hamburg, Germany’s second largest city, a majority 
has been achieved in a political referendum in favor of a deprivatization of the local electricity 
grid and generation capacities. In Berlin, a similar initiative has reached a majority of 83 
percent, but the necessary quorum of 25 percent was missed by 0.9 percent. In both cases, 
citizens proposed a remunicipalisation by the city or a cooperative model based on the joint 
investment of citizens in a democratically controlled and consumer-owned enterprise.  
In addition to the role that citizens play in the political process, they have also started to 
choose the type of supplier they want on the market. Since 1998, German electricity 
consumers can freely choose from a wide range of electricity suppliers and tariffs, including 
green power options. Besides price, a supplier’s general service, or the share of renewable 
energy, various characteristics of suppliers have been identified as important attributes of 
electricity contracts in discrete choice experiments (Amador et al., 2013; Murakami et al., 
2015). Firm size, location, or commitments to price transparency affect consumers’ 
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willingness-to-pay (WTP) for electricity (Kaenzig et al., 2013; Sagebiel et al., 2014). 
However, these studies have overlooked the fact that supplier characteristics may interact with 
other properties of supply contracts (cf. Müller and Sagebiel, 2015). Moreover, the 
perspective of the citizen-consumer choosing a supplier on the market is an important 
complement to the perspective of the citizen-voter articulating his or her preferences at the 
voting booth (Yildiz et al., 2015). In this paper, we use data from a discrete choice experiment 
with German electricity consumers to test if WTP for renewable energy differs by supplier 
governance.   
2. Theoretical Framework and Context 
Consumers can observe and experience numerous attributes of contracts with their electric 
utility. Some attributes are independent of the contract and known to the consumer ex-ante 
(e.g., the expected frequency of power cuts). Others can be experienced by the consumer ex-
post (e.g., response time after a complaint is placed). A third group can neither be observed 
ex-ante nor experienced ex-post. For instance, consumers cannot easily obtain information on 
the electricity generation process. This is important because, today, different standards 
regarding electricity generation from renewable energy exist, and firms have adopted a wide 
range of generation options. While some companies ensure instantaneous generation from 
renewable sources at all times, other companies base their green power tariffs on Tradable 
Renewable Certificates which give rise to relabeling and fraud (cf. Sagebiel et al., 2014). It is 
difficult for consumers to observe the electricity generation process and assess its 
environmental impact, thus creating a potential “lemon market” (Akerlof, 1970) for renewable 
energy. 
In Akerlof’s (1970) model, there are buyers and sellers of goods. Information is asymmetric, 
and sellers know the true quality of the good they sell. Buyers have information only on the 
distribution of quality in the market as a whole. A high quality seller would typically ask for a 
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price higher than a buyer would be willing to pay, thus giving rise to adverse selection (i.e., 
low quality sellers are dragged into the market, and high quality sellers are pushed out). 
Market failure and even a complete breakdown of the market can be the result. Akerlof 
concludes that several economic institutions are created to counteract information 
asymmetries. For instance, labeling or licensing may exist primarily for reasons of quality 
monitoring. This idea is the basis for Spence’s (1973) signaling model in which the selling 
party can reveal the quality of a good by engaging in a costly signal whose price negatively 
correlates with quality. Investment in the signal will pay off only for sellers of good quality. 
Consequently, prices can be differentiated by quality on the basis of the signal. Although 
labels and certification schemes exist for renewable energy in Germany, one study found that 
less than three percent of consumers know them well (Mattes, 2012, p. 6). Even more 
importantly, less than one quarter of respondents who are actually using a renewable-energy-
only tariff are aware of labels and certificates (ibid.)  
Apart from signaling and labeling, the cost of obtaining information on a company differs by 
firm type. Because obtaining and processing information is a costly process in itself, 
consumers may assess quality on the basis of these generic firm types as “quasi-labels.” Vis-
à-vis locally producing firms (e.g., utilities run by the municipality or consumer-owned 
businesses like cooperatives), it might be easier to obtain information regarding the electricity 
generation process (Bonus, 1986; Vetter & Karantininis, 2002). Specifically, they might 
believe that because information from municipality-owned utilities and cooperatives is 
accessible at low cost, these firms may be more trustworthy and less likely to engage in 
dishonest behavior when reporting quality (cf. Castaldo, 2007). Thus, the organizational form 
of the distribution company might help to reduce information asymmetries. 
3. Material and Methods 
3.1 Empirical Strategy 
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We modeled consumer utility from electricity consumption on the basis of alternative supply 
contracts that differ in their attributes. Utility  of respondent  in choice situation  
between alternatives  is derived from characteristics , where the effect on utility of each 
element in  is described by parameter vector 	. We applied a random utility approach so 
that utility  is comprised of a deterministic part 
 and a stochastic part ɛ. The ɛ 
are identical and independent (iid) extreme value type I distributed with the cumulative 
distribution function ɛ = exp− expɛ . In order to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity in preferences, we applied a mixed logit model with random parameters where 
utility parameters from 	 are assumed to be normally distributed with density 	 (Hensher 
and Greene, 2003) so that 
 = 
 + ɛ = 	 + ɛ 
The panel data random parameters (mixed) logit choice probability is given by 
Pr   =   ∏
 ! "#$%
∑  ! "'$%
(
')*
+
,-
.
/.
	0	. 
Parameters 	 can be estimated by using the maximum simulated likelihood method (Train, 
2008).  
Other models capturing preference heterogeneity are readily available. For instance, the latent 
class logit model assumes that preferences fall into a finite number of discrete classes. From a 
theoretical viewpoint, the distribution of preferences could take various forms (Hensher & 
Greene, 2003), and consequently, model choice is based on statistical considerations and the 
analyst’s judgement (Glenk et al., 2012; Sagebiel, 2011). Here, we opted for the simpler 
mixed logit model.  
Our discrete choice experiment contained labeled alternatives for three different types of 
suppliers. Respondents could choose between a cooperative, an investor-owned firm, and a 
municipally-owned enterprise. In addition, contracts differed in their price per kilowatt hour, 
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ranging from 23 to 30 Eurocents and the share of renewable energy (either 0%, 33%, 67%, or 
100% share of renewable energy). In the modeling approach, we used alternative-specific 
parameters for the share of renewable energy and a generic parameter for the price attribute. 
Each supplier is identified with an alternative-specific constant (ASC) where we used the 
constant for an investor-owned firm as the reference. The utility function for each alternative  
is  

 = 1234 + 156_89 + 1:4;< 
where  represents the supplier type, 89 is the share of renewable energy from a supplier of 
type , the 1< are parameters measuring the impact on utility, and 4;< is the price per 
kilowatt hour charged by supplier . 
3.2 Experimental Design and Data 
An introductory text explained both attributes to respondents prior to the discrete choice 
experiment. We used a d-efficient design, optimized for a multinomial logit model with priors 
taken from a previous study (Sagebiel et al., 2014), created with the software package NGene 
(ChoiceMetrics, 2012) which resulted in 24 choice sets divided into three blocks. Thus, each 
respondent faced eight choice sets. We randomized the order of presentation of choice sets to 
avoid fatigue and learning effects (Savage and Waldman, 2008). Table 1 shows a sample 
choice set. 
 [INSERT Table 1 APPROX HERE]  
The survey was conducted online from March 10, 2014 to March 24, 2014 with 2,174 
German consumers who were older than 18 years and took or would take part in the decision 
on the electricity supply company of their household. In collaboration with the marketing 
research institute forsa.omninet, respondents were randomly selected from a panel of 10,000 
German households that are representative of Germany with respect to age, income, gender, 
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education, and region (cf. Forsa, 2015). The response rate was 46%. The questionnaire 
included socio-demographic and attitudinal questions as well as questions concerning energy 
use. The mean time for completion was approximately 20 minutes. Table 2 presents summary 
statistics for some important socio-demographic variables of respondents.  
[INSERT Table 2 APPROX HERE] 
Respondents were on average 52 years old, and roughly half of the respondents were male. 
The mean monthly income on a ten-point scale was 5.6 (equivalent to 2,000 to 3,000 Euros), 
and respondents lived in households with two members on average. More than half of the 
respondents were married. We used a seven-point ordinal scale that included the most 
common degrees in Germany for asking about education. Less than two percent of 
respondents did not have any degree, and approximately 16 percent had a college or 
university degree. Roughly half of the respondents had previous experience with changing the 
electricity supply company. 
4. Results  
Table 3 presents estimation results and WTP values for two different specifications of the 
mixed logit model. Model 2 is an extension of Model 1 that controls for socio-demographic 
heterogeneity by introducing interaction terms with the type of supplier (a dummy variable for 
female respondents; a dummy variable for respondents who have switched to another supplier 
in the past; age in years). For easier interpretation of coefficients, we used deviations from the 
mean instead of absolute values for the socio-demographic interaction terms. 
[INSERT Table 3 APPROX HERE] 
Both models have a high explanatory power as indicated by the large => values. Parameter 
estimates are similar in both models. Small differences result from the slightly different 
samples due to missing observations for some of the socio-demographic variables (cf. Table 
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2). Positive signs for the type of supplier (Municipally-owned, Cooperative) show that 
consumers prefer electricity supplied by cooperatives or municipally-owned utilities 
compared to the baseline of an investor-owned firm. As expected, the coefficient of Price is 
negative and statistically significantly different from zero, indicating that respondents, ceteris 
paribus, prefer lower prices. Large, positive, and statistically significant coefficients for the 
interaction variables of supplier type with renewables indicate that renewables in the energy 
mix are preferred. Differences in these coefficients indicate that the slope of the increase 
differs by supplier type. Significant standard deviations of the random parameters show that 
preferences are heterogeneous, although socio-demographic variables already capture some 
heterogeneity in specification (2). 
Specifically, WTP for electricity from cooperatives and municipally-owned utilities increases 
with age, being female, and having experience with a change in supplier. In a dynamically 
changing market, customers continuously learn. Notably, in the model that includes observed 
heterogeneity, customers who are experienced with switching their supplier exhibit a larger 
WTP of almost one Eurocent per kilowatt hour for cooperatives and almost two Eurocents per 
kilowatt hour for public enterprises. Based on model specification (1), Table 4 displays 
consumers’ additional WTP by type of supplier and share of renewable energy in the power 
mix. 
[INSERT Table 4 APPROX HERE] 
It can be easily seen that consumers prefer electricity provided by municipally-owned 
suppliers the most followed by cooperatives. The increase in WTP for renewable energy is 
steep for municipally-owned suppliers and cooperatives. It is lower – roughly half – for 
investor-owned firms. 
5. Discussion 
9 
 
Between 2011 and 2013, the price of a kWh of retail level electricity was between 25 and 29 
Eurocents in Germany, including all taxes (Eurostat, 2014). In our estimates, between non-
renewable energy from an investor-owned firm and renewable energy from a municipality-
owned utility, one can observe a difference of approximately seven Eurocents, which is 
roughly equal to one quarter of total price. The difference between a cooperative and an 
investor-owned firm is less than one Eurocent for non-renewable energy; these figures 
increase to a difference of approximately two and a half Eurocents for tariffs that are entirely 
based on renewable energy. Thus, trust vis-à-vis public enterprises and vertical integration via 
consumer cooperatives are important determinants of WTP for renewable energy.  
In a study of German electricity consumers, a lack of trust for 16.1 percent of the respondents 
has been identified as the main reason for not purchasing renewable energy (Rommel & 
Meyerhoff, 2009, p. 79). This lack of trust could be addressed by promoting certification and 
labeling schemes. However, currently only a few consumers – less than three percent – are 
aware of labels and certificates in Germany (Mattes, 2012, p. 6). Moreover, the variety of 
labels makes it difficult for consumers to learn about the differences, and ultimately, there is 
the meta-problem of quality uncertainty and fraud regarding labeling and certification 
(Banerjee & Solomon, 2003). 
In Akerlof’s (1970) model, the idea of quality uncertainty is illustrated by the market for used 
cars, a good which is different from electricity in many aspects. Unlike in the case of quality 
uncertainty regarding renewable energy, buyers of used cars will learn about the good they are 
considering for purchase. Although this does not necessarily have implications on market 
functioning ex-ante, it can be important when there are repeated transactions because sellers 
may be able to develop reputations or they may be able to offer guarantees. For credence 
goods which are consumed on a permanent basis, this is more difficult as uncertainty cannot 
be reduced with experience. 
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Our results have shown that there is substantial heterogeneity in preferences regarding the 
type of supplier. In particular, women, older respondents, and respondents who have 
experience with switching suppliers exhibit higher WTP values for utilities that are not 
investor-owned. In a study on the marketing efforts of German electricity utilities, Herbes and 
Ramme (2014) show that firms could improve in communicating environmental benefits to 
consumers on their websites. Our findings suggest that municipally-owned utilities and 
cooperatives should also take some effort in communicating their firm type, especially to the 
elderly and female demographic segments of the market. Marketing channels that are more 
likely to reach these groups might be preferred. The same applies to people who have changed 
their supplier in the past. 
6. Conclusions  
Germany and other European countries seek to green their energy systems. Citizens can 
articulate their preferences regarding the energy system in at least two ways. On the ballot, 
they can use their voice to push for political change. In the market, they can opt for the type of 
supplier they prefer. In this paper, we have focused on the latter aspect. We have shown that 
consumers are often willing to voluntarily adopt renewable energy tariffs, even if the price is 
higher. Preferences for supplier type are reflected in a higher WTP for electricity from public 
enterprises and cooperatives. Furthermore, there is a large interaction effect between the share 
of electricity from renewables and supplier type. 
Information asymmetries make it difficult for consumers to assess the quality of green energy 
supply. In such “lemon markets,” vertical integration and trust play an important role. We 
found that consumers are willing to pay premiums of approximately four Eurocents for 
renewable energy from cooperatives or municipally-owned firms in comparison to only two 
Eurocents from investor-owned firms. 
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Currently, the renewable energy market offers opportunities mainly for cooperatives and 
public enterprises. Experienced customers are especially willing to pay more. Investor-owned 
firms may counter information asymmetries by ensuring quality and engaging in (credible) 
labeling schemes to increase transparency for consumers. Alternatively, some firms may 
completely abandon generation from exhaustible resources, leading to a polarization in the 
generation portfolio of investor-owned firms. Consumers can then more easily judge the type 
of energy they buy. Lower revenues for green power options increase investor-owned firms’ 
incentives to cheat. If such cases become publicly known and they are attributed to the 
specific type of firm, consumers’ WTP may be further lowered. A downward spiral, and 
ultimately a collapse of the “lemon market” as predicted by Akerlof’s (1970) seminal model, 
may be the result. Our findings also imply that the successful deprivatization of energy 
suppliers through political initiatives has the potential to increase consumer welfare, 
particularly when the share of renewables is large. If consumer information websites and 
consumer protection organizations were to provide more detailed information on the energy 
mix and the origin of renewables offered by utilities, information asymmetries could be 
reduced in the future.   
Public policy may play a role in setting a clear standard of what constitutes electricity from 
renewable resources and in promoting respective certification and labeling. Labeling by the 
government may be preferred over private labels because long-term commitment and 
credibility are crucial for programs to work effectively (Banerjee & Solomon, 2003). The 
positive experience with the European label for organic food, which is now mandatory in all 
members states (Regulation European Commission No. 834/2007), may serve as an example 
for policy-makers. As Janssen and Hamm (2012) indicate in a study of six European 
countries, consumers have difficulties understanding and valuing the many different labels 
available for organic food. However, if compared to private alternatives, national 
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government’s labels and the European Union label of organic food products are relatively 
well-known. Furthermore, trust, credibility, and consumers’ perceptions of the strictness of 
standards and their monitoring reaches high levels for these labels. As of now, Germany and 
other European countries do not have governmental labeling schemes for renewable energy. 
Thus, there is an opportunity to develop a transparent label at the European level, preventing a 
variety of national labels to emerge (cf. Truffer et al., 2001). Whether or not consumers would 
accept such a label remains to be seen. In particular, it is an interesting question if a label 
would have the potential to increase trust in a way that it would substantially reduce 
differences in WTP for renewables produced by the three types of suppliers investigated in 
this paper.  
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Table 1: Example of a Choice Set 
 Cooperative Municipally-owned Private 
Share of Renewable 
Energy 
67% 33% 100% 
Price 0.29 Euro per 
kilowatt hour 
0.27 Euro per 
kilowatt hour 
0.23 Euro per 
kilowatt hour 
I choose □ □ □ 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Selected Respondent Characteristics 
Variable Description Obs. Mean  SD Min Max 
AGE Age in years 2174 52.78  14.11 19 86 
CHANGED = 1 if respondent has changed 
supplier in the past 
2169 0.51 .50 0 1 
FEMALE = 1 if female 2174 .45  .49 0 1 
INCOME Categories for net household monthly 
income (1 = less than 500 Euros, 10 = 
more than 4,500 Euros) 
1887 5.60 2.23 1 10 
HHSIZE Number of persons living in the 
household 
2156 2.19  1.08 1 7 
EDUCATION Highest degree (1 = no degree, 7 = 
university degree) 
2117 3.68  1.87 1 7 
MARRIED = 1 if married 2130 .56  .49 0 1 
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Table 3: Model Results and WTP Values 
 (1) Attributes only (2) Socio-demographic Interactions 
 Coefficients WTP Coefficients WTP 
Mean     
Municipally-
owned 
1.152*** 1.819*** 1.182*** 1.867*** 
 
(0.0590) (0.0898) (0.0602) (0.0921) 
 
    
Cooperative 0.347*** 0.548*** 0.403*** 0.636*** 
 
(0.0572) (0.0899) (0.0582) (0.0914) 
 
    
Price -0.633***  -0.633***  
 
(0.0106)  (0.0106)  
 
    
Cooperative x 
Renewable 
0.954*** 1.506*** 0.957*** 1.512*** 
 
(0.0358) (0.0532) (0.0356) (0.0529) 
 
    
Municipally -
owned x 
Renewable 
1.066*** 1.682*** 1.073*** 1.695*** 
 
(0.0400) (0.0584) (0.0398) (0.0579) 
 
    
Investor-
owned x 
Renewable 
0.487*** 0.769*** 0.510*** 0.806*** 
 
(0.0373) (0.0585) (0.0368) (0.0579) 
 
    
Cooperative x 
Female 
  0.243** 0.384** 
 
  (0.0984) (0.155) 
 
    
Municipally -
owned x 
  0.534*** 0.844*** 
19 
 
Female 
 
  (0.0982) (0.155) 
 
    
Cooperative x 
Changed 
  0.543*** 0.858*** 
 
  (0.0974) (0.154) 
 
    
Municipally -
owned x 
Changed 
  1.166*** 1.841*** 
 
  (0.0976) (0.154) 
 
    
Cooperative x 
Age 
  0.00781** 0.0123** 
 
  (0.00339) (0.00536) 
 
    
Municipally -
owned x Age 
  0.0244*** 0.0385*** 
 
  (0.00342) (0.00540) 
Standard Deviations of Random Parameters 
 
Cooperative x 
Renewable 
1.148***  1.132***  
 
(0.0394)  (0.0396)  
 
    
Municipally -
owned x 
Renewable 
1.291***  1.265***  
 
(0.0441)  (0.0437)  
 
    
Investor-
owned x 
Renewable 
1.224***  1.179***  
 
(0.0412)  (0.0404)  
20 
 
N 52176 52056 
AIC 22429.5 22129.6 
BIC 22509.2 22262.5 
=> 3677.6 3446.8 
Log Lik. 
(NULL) 
-13044.6 -12773.2 
Log Lik. -11205.7 -11049.8 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Additional WTP in Eurocents per kilowatt hour by share of renewables and 
supplier type 
Share of Renewable energy is 
 
 
0% 33% 67% 100% 
Firm is 
investor-owned 0 (Baseline) 
0.769*** 
(0.0585) 
1.538*** 
(0.117) 
2.306*** 
(0.176) 
municipally-owned 
1.819*** 
(0.0898) 
3.501*** 
(0.0907) 
5.184*** 
(0.123) 
6.866*** 
(0.171) 
a cooperative 
0.548*** 
(0.0899) 
2.054*** 
(0.089) 
3.560*** 
(0.116) 
5.066*** 
(0.157) 
Source: own calculations based on delta method; standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
